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DISCUSSION: 
THE UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF GOD: 
BEYOND DIALECTICS AND RHETORIC 
GREGORY A. CLARK 
"I don't want to be deceived," he said. "I am looking to 
Reason to keep me from illusion." Jerry was one of my 
brightest philosophy majors. His father was a pastor. 
Under the influence of higher criticism of the Bible and 
Nietzsche, however, the effect of countless sermons and his 
religious upbringing had diminished. Jerry was convinced 
that his father was deceived and that Jerry himself had been 
brought up in a faith that was little more than wishful 
thinking. "Reason" was going to protect him from illusions 
that might try to trap him later in life. 
The dichotomy is common and ancient: truth opposes 
illusion, reason opposes power, philosophy opposes rhetoric, 
and real argument opposes merely verbal links in discourse. 
Almost every philosopher since Plato, who sets out the 
dichotomy in the Apology, dwells on these oppositions. 
Interestingly, even those who chasten and restrict reason do 
not hesitate to make the opposition and condemn rhetoric. 
Alasdair MacIntyre offers up a familiar and representative 
lamentation: "In the forums of popular life rhetorical 
effectiveness in persuasion and manipulation prevails against 
rational argument.." 1 
The concepts of "power" and "violence" provide the basis for 
the opposition. According to philosophy, rhetoric values 
effectiveness and power, regardless of the rational merits of 
the case. Violence destroys or tears apart integrity -- the 
integrity of the will, of the mind, of the body. Rhetorical 
power becomes violent when it does not respect the 
rationality and will of the hearer, when it aims to impose the 
will of the speaker on the hearer. 
While traditional philosophers want to avoid violence, 
postmodern philosophers think that violence is unavoidable, 
but that some forms of violence are better than others. That 
is, philosophers like Nietzsche and Deleuze maintain the 
dichotomy, but they defend the sophists. Everything is the 
will to power. Dialectical argument merely disguises the 
will that seeks to dominate other wills. It is not on that 
account less a will. 
Gregory A. Clark teaches in the Philosophy Department at 
North Park University. 
Any cnt1c1sm of the Enlightenment and contemporary 
Christian higher education must consider the relation 
postmodernism, (2) the ethic of love and peace espoused 
by the Christian Church, and (3) the meeting of (1) and (2) 
in the church-related college. I believe that we must think 
about how to construct a university where the rhetorical 
power of this dichotomy between rhetoric and dialectics no 
longer holds the minds of students like Jerry. We must both 
break down the dichotomy and learn to value the power of 
words. 
Accordingly, I will begin with an account of Maclntyre's 
proposal, in his book Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry, for a postliberal university. Maclntyre's postliberal 
university institutionalizes the conflict of wills that 
postmodernism claims is everywhere. I will then turn to 
John Milbank's criticism of Maclntyre's position. According 
to Milbank, Maclntyre's position is neither Christian nor 
postmodern. I will sketch a part of Milbank's criticism of 
MacIntyre in order to show some problems with taking the 
postliberal university as a model for a church-related 
college. Finally, I will offer a modest proposal for the form 
of discourse the should prevail in a church-related college. 
I. The Postliberal University
In his Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, Alasdair
MacIntyre distinguishes three types of universities. The
preliberal university of 18th and 19th century Scotland and
the United States could assume a fairly homogeneous and
well-educated public. Aided by religious tests to exclude
and promote faculty 1 , it was able to advance considerably.
The preliberal university produced a constrained agreement.
The liberal university claims to open its doors to all. By 
doing away with religious tests, it would promote progress 
and agreement in all areas of knowledge. The liberal 
university, then, claims to produce an unconstrained 
agreement. In fact, however, we can now see that the liberal 
university does impose constraints. Further, these 
constraints have cost the liberal university the resources to 
understand and to justify its own existence. 
If we cannot return to the constrained agreement of the 
preliberal university, nor to the feigned unconstrained 
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agreement of the liberal university, where shall we go? 
MacIntyre suggests that we should develop a university 
system that will be a "place of constrained disagreement, or 
imposed participation in conflict, in which a central 
responsibility of higher education would be to initiate 
students into conflict. "2 What would this look like? 
MacIntyre continues, 
Surely a set of rival universities would result, each modeled 
on, but improving upon, its own best predecessor . . . .  And 
thus the wider society would be confronted with the claims 
a/rival universities. each advancing its own enquiries in its 
own terms and each securing the type of agreement 
necessary to ensure the progress and flourishing of its 
enquiries by its own set of exclusions and prohibitions . . .
. But then also required would be a set of institutionalized 
forums in which the debate between rival types of enquiry 
was afforded rhetorical expression. 3 
Macintyre's postliberal university has two tiers, both of 
which emphasize constraint and conflict. First, the 
university must establish its own identity. This university 
will look much like the preliberal university that embodies a 
constrained agreement. That is to say, arguments alone are 
not enough to establish agreement; there must be some 
authority to enforce agreement. For the Thomist university, 
this authority will be the church, and ultimately the Pope. 4 
This is not a simple sectarianism, however. Macintyre's 
sketch of the university is an attempt to institutionally 
embody a tradition and to allow for dialogue between other 
mstitut10nalized versions of moral enquiry. If this were 
sectarian, they would never come into contact with each 
other. So, second, the universities in the system need to 
engage in open hostilities on a level fighting field. In spite of 
the claim, in Three Rival Versions, that this conflict will 
have a rhetorical expression, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? clearly indicates that these conflicts are 
mediated dialectically. Moral enquiry progresses, according 
to MacIntyre, through open argument, both within a 
traditwn and across traditions. The best tradition will be 
able to solve the problems of other traditions and be able to 
account for the failure of the inferior tradition. Let us then 
define the postliberal university as a place of dialectically 
mediated conflict and constrained agreement. Such is the 
postmodern opportunity for the university according to 
MacIntyre. 
II. The City of God
MacIntyre has come under attack by John Milbank in his
Theology and Social Theory.5 According to Milbank,
Macintyre's move to dialectics in Whose Justice? Which
Rationality?6 shows that he is too much the philosopher and 
not sufficiently Christian or postmodern. Dialectics is itself 
a form of the will to power. Insofar as MacIntyre does not 
realize this, he has not yet crossed the bridge of 
postmodemity. Insofar as he still appeals to dialectics, he 
remains within an ontology of violence and has not yet taken 
up the cross of Christian peace. 
I am interested in the second criticism for the purposes of 
this essay. That is, I want to ask if violence and conflict are 
necessary and constitutive parts of the life of the mind. If
dialectics is itself the embodiment of conflict, how might we 
begin to think differently? In what follows, I will first draw 
the distinction between the ontology of violence and the 
ontology of peace. I will then contrast Macintyre's Thomist 
postliberal university with the church-related college. 
A. Counter Ontologies
An ontology of violence posits a primordial conflict that 
politics, morality, and dialectics each attempt to overcome or 
limit with another act of violence. Milbank finds an 
"ontology of violence" in the philosophy and institutions of 
the ancients, the modems, and the postmodems. Since the 
ancients and the postmodems are committed to an ontology 
of violence, Maclntyre's choice between Aristotle and 
Nietzsche does not present us with true alternatives. 
In contrast with the history of philosophy, Milbank finds an 
"ontology of peace" expressed in Augustine's The City of 
God. Peace is a harmonious agreement based in charity. 
Christianity posits an ontology of peace because God is the 
most basic reality, and the God of Christians is a God who 
is love in trinity and who created the universe out of 
generosity and love. Milbank argues that only Christianity 
provides an ontological option to violence. The church is 
that society which promotes and incarnates the charity made 
possible through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. 
B. Counter Universities
While Milbank does not consider the implications of his 
criticism for a university or for a church-related college, one 
might easily generate a series of questions that extend the 
criticism to Maclntyre's proposal for the postliberal 
university. Is a "place of constrained disagreement, or 
imposed participation in conflict" compatible with a society 
founded on an ontology of peace? Can a higher education 
that is Christian both attend to its identity within the 
Christian tradition and engage in open hostilities as 
instituted in the postliberal university? Can a postliberal 
university exist in the City of God? 
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IfMacintyre's post-liberal university and the church-related 
college are rooted in mutually exclusive categories, then the 
postliberal university would amount to an institut ionalized 
hostility to Christian identity . To take Macintyre's 
postliberal university as the model for the church-related 
college would be to forfeit the college's identity in the 
mission of the church. I will argue that Macintyre's 
postliberal university is modeled on an ontology of violence 
insofar as it defmes itself by dialectical argument. The 
church-related college articulates an ontology of peace 
insofar as it embodies a history of faith and persuasion. 
l. The Thomist University
Consider first the Thomist postliberal university. Thomism, 
for MacIntyre, is part of the history of philosophy or 
intellectual history. 7 He reads Thomas, in the end, as a 
philosopher rather than as a theologian whose work reflects 
the faith and practice of the church. Thomism is a set of 
beliefs, an intellectual position, an extended dialectical 
argument, that is, a tradition. 
A Thomism instituted in a postliberal university requires 
conflict. This conflict is mediated dialectically. Otherwise 
said, dialectic is the intellectual management of conflict. 
The Platonic dialogues, Aristotle's method, and Thomas's 
method show dialectics as the attempt to bring many 
competing voices into a unified harmony. 8 This unified 
harmony is the Idea of the Good and of peace.9 
Postmodernism asks whether dialectics can bring about such 
harmony. Socrates and Plato face this question when they 
confront the Sophists, and Aristotle confronts it as well, 
since "good" can be said in many ways. Plato, Aristotle, and 
many Thomisms were not entirely successful in achieving a 
harmony through dialectical means. Neither did the 
preliberal or liberal university succeed. While MacIntyre 
appeals to dialectics, agreement within the postliberal 
Thomist university is itself guaranteed by a decree of the 
Pope. If dialectics cannot establish harmony, "then only a 
merely 'effective' peace is possible, a 'secular' peace of 
temporarily suspended violence or regulated competition. " 10 
That is, the conflict is only resolved by one party imposing 
their will on another. 
2. The Church-Related College
Contrast the Thomist university with the nature of the 
church-related college. The church-related college differs 
from non-affiliated colleges in that it serves the mission of 
the church in some way. The church is the community of 
those people whose lives have been claimed by the God who 
is love and peace. The preeminence of the peace of the 
Lord, however, is not established or shown dialectically, by 
managing conflict through argument. Rather, it 1s 
established by God in Jesus, and it is shown in the life and 
preaching of the church. Phillips Brooks says, 
However, the Gospel may be capable of statement in 
dogmatic form, its truest element we know is not in dogma 
but in personal l�fe. Christianity is Christ; and we can 
easily understand how a truth which is of such a peculiar 
character that a person can stand forth and say of it, "I am 
the Truth," must always be best conveyed through, must 
indeed be almost incapable of being perfectly conveyed 
except through, personality. And so some form of 
preaching must be essential to the prevalence and spread 
of the knowledge of Christ among men. u 
Note two interrelated points. First, while dogmas are 
important and necessary, the church is not founded on 
dogma or a set of articles. Second, and this is crucial, this 
first point does not mean that we stop preaching. Jesus 
preached; Peter and Paul preached. In preaching, the church 
takes its native form. As a form of discourse, preaching's 
primary goal is not to establish any given set of ideas. The 
truth of the gospel is the person of Jesus, and this truth 1s 
communicated through the personality of the preacher as he 
or she preaches. Preaching articulates a counter-logos which 
is neither dialectical or sophistical rhetoric. It is more 
original than either. The Christian logos gives "pride of 
place to opinion (doxa), testimony (marturia) and 
persuasion (pistis)." 12 The God of peace is revealed through 
the power of the Word. 
Both of these points help to clarify the difference between 
the Thomist university and the church-related college. The 
church-related college is not founded on any one doctrine or 
school of thought, and its goal is not to produce more and 
better scholars. Perhaps Thomism is a tradition of moral 
enquiry: Christianity is not. While Christianity has much to 
say about the things that concerned philosophers, it is not on 
that account oriented and guided by philosophy. Christianity 
is not one more competing vision of the good life. It is not 
graspable through dialectics; it is not itself promulgated 
through dialectics. It is a mode of discourse aiming to reveal 
the God of peace with whom the apostles were acquainted. 
"Perhaps," Milbank says, "we have to take more seriously 
the Biblical narratives ... which presumably tell how things 
happened in the very idiom adopted by their users for the 
making-of-things-to-happen." 13 
Further, this "idiom," this preaching that humans can now be 
reconciled to God and to each other, contains an acid that 
cannot be neutralized by philosophical systems or 
arguments, and this too can be seen in the preaching of the 
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apostles. John Howard Yoder observes that the apostles did 
not request "free speech and room for one more stand in the 
Athenian marketplace of ideas for a new variant of already 
widely respected diaspora Judaism." Rather, 
A handfitl of messianic Jews, moving beyond the defenses 
of their somewhat separate society to attack the intellectual 
bastions of majority culture, refused to contextualize their 
message by clothing it in the categories the world held 
ready. Instead, they seized the categories, hammered them 
into other shapes, and turned the cosmology on its head. 
. . The development of a high Christology is the natural 
cultural ricochet of a missionary ecclesiology when it 
collides as it must with whatever cosmology explains and 
governs the world. 14 
In the arena of ideas, Christians do not fight fairly. Which 
is to say that they don't fight. They do not pit Christian 
ideas against non-Christian ideas. Rather, they introduce the 
person of Christ who is irreducible to any and all ideas. 
Christianity will always oppose the absoluteness and 
adequacy of every system or idea, while refusing itself to be 
reduced to a system or an idea. Philosophy will always find 
Christianity an unassimilatable phenomenon. Like the Son 
of Man, Christianity is nomadic. It is the reef upon which 
the ships of idolatrous philosophies are wrecked. The effect 
of this preaching, Yoder insists, is an intellectual pluralism 
and relativism, for 
pluralism/relativism is a confusing world, but it is not an 
alien one. It is the child of the Hebrew and Christian 
intervention in cultural history. It is the spinoff from 
missionary mobility, from the love of the enemy, from the 
relativizing of political sovereignty, from a dialogical 
vision of the church,from a charismatic vision of the many 
members of the body, from the disavowal of empire and 
theocracy. It lays before us the challenge of convincing 
interlocutors who are not our dependents, of affirming a 
particular witness to be good news without being interested 
in showing that other people are bad. 15 
The Christian witness, like the Word about which it testifies, 
is active and affirming. Conflict with and reaction to "other 
views" does not constitute the first move or have priority.16
The first move in the Christian witness is not our move at 
all. Rather, God comes and reveals himself to us as love. 
Our response to God's love constitutes the second move. 
The second move is not exclusively or primarily a matter of 
intellectual assent but an obedience expressed in love for 
one's neighbor. This is the essentially active and affirming 
nature of the Word and of the preaching of Christian 
witness. Only such a Word and such a witness can embody 
an affirmation of power that is non-violent. 
This non-violent affirmation precedes the violence of both 
rhetoric and dialectics, as well as the violence embodied in 
the dichotomy between rhetoric and dialectics. That is, the 
Christian witness refuses to impose its will on others, either 
dialectically or rhetorically (I Cor. I: 17, 2: 13), for this is the 
way God treats us.17 This feature of the Christian witness 
prevents the church-related college from taking the 
postliberal university as an acceptable model. 
MacIntyre himself catches sight of part of the problem when 
he ceases to play the role of the philosopher. He claims "this 
divorce between rhetorical effectiveness and rational 
argumentation is deeply at odds with the thirteenth-century 
Dominican ideal, especially as articulated by Aquinas, in 
which the homily was to be the end-product of an education 
in philosophy and theology."18 The divorce also runs 
counter to the self-understanding and goals of many of those 
who founded our church-related colleges, not for training 
scholars capable of engaging successfully in dialectical 
warfare, but for preparing those capable of being witnesses 
(µap·rnpe�) of Jesus. 
The affirmative message of Christian preaching does 
respond to "other views," but only as a third moment in the 
Christian witness. These other positions are not merely 
"unjustified, 11 or "an expression of (bad) power, 11 but 
"idolatrous." The category of idolatry indicates that the 
problem is not so much intellectual confusion or dullness, 
but our disordered loves. These disordered loves can keep 
us from confronting God as a person, rather than as an idea, 
and they bar us from full participation in the City of God. 
Preaching introduces disordered lovers to the God who is 
love. The church-related college, taking its guide from the 
preaching of the church, seeks to educate our desires and set 
them in order. 
III. Conclusion
Jerry, the student to whom I referred above, understood
Christianity as a set of beliefs that have an absolute status.
He thought that he had lost his faith when he exchanged one
set of absolute ideas for another set of equally absolute
ideas. The first set of ideas had been instilled in his mind
rhetorically; the second set imparted dialectically. He
thought that "Reason" stood outside of all power and could
save him from "illusion."
Neither the liberal or the postliberal university have the 
resources to respond to Jerry's loss of faith, for they are 
rooted in a dialectically managed conflict of ideas. That is, 
postmodemism shows us that dialectics, rhetoric, and the 
opposition between them all assume a form of violence. By 
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institutionalizing these forms of discourse, both the liberal 
and postliberal universities ultimately underwrite an 
unavoidable violence. 
The God worshiped by Christians is a God of love and 
peace. Thus, the church-related college must institutionally 
embody an ontology of non-violence both in what it says and 
in its mode of speaking. The message proclaimed by 
Christians, therefore, takes the form of preaching. Preaching 
calls for a transformation of the entire person. The truths of 
Christianity are not known cheaply or without personal risk. 
The church-related college, if it is to train preachers, must 
educate not the minds of students to be scholars, but the 
loves and desires of persons to be a preacher. 
The Christian witness will not always convince modernist 
students like Jerry. It will not overwhelm the 
postmodernists. This is the risk it takes in affirming non­
violence. In a postmodern era, it is this affirmation that 
provides the church-related college with its most valuable 
resource. 
NOTES 
l. Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame,
1990) 168.
2. MacIntyre says "Cleghorn was rightly preferred to Hume
for the chair in moral philosophy at Edinburgh" (TRV, 224).
3. TRV, 230-1.
4. TRV, 234.
5. This is Maclntyre's position in Whose Justice.? Which
Rationality? (Notre Dame, 1988). See Martha Nussbaum's
review ofMacintyre's position in "Recoiling from Reason,"
New York Review of Books (7 December 1989)36-41.
6. Blackwell, 1993.
7. MacIntyre is less dialectical, I think, in both After Virtue
and in Three Rival Versions.
8. MacIntyre does insist on the importance of various
practices for an intellectual tradition. Nevertheless, he fails
to show how Christian theology emerges out of the life and
the practices of the Church.
9. Milbank, 337.
IO. Milbank, 335. 
11. Milbank, 334.
12. Phillips Brooks, The Joy of Preaching (Grand Rapids:
Kregel Publications, 1989) 27. This means that books, e­
texts, the world wide web, or video courses are less than
adequate for the nature of Christian truth.
13. Milbank, 328.
14. Milbank, 121.
15. Yoder, "But We Do See Jesus," The Priestly Kingdom:
Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, 1984) 54.
16. Yoder, 60.
17. My concern here is motivated in part by Nietzsche,
Toward a Genealogy of of Morals. Essay I, X. See also
Paul Ricoeur, "Negativity and Primary Affirmation."
History and Truth (Northwestern University Press, 1965)
305-328.
18. See Pascal's Pensees for the development of this theme.
19. TR V, 169. While I do not want to identify the homily
with the various form that preaching may take, it is perhaps
an ideal that can orient us.
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